Indonesia’s Civil-Military Relationship in the Post Suharto Era

Oleh: Kolonel Inf Imam Edy Mulyono, Anggota Dewan Penasehat Harian TANDEF

Introduction

The Indonesian Armed Forces unique establishment was part of the root problems of current frictions of the civil-military relations. Lots of civil-military expert had written in this subject. The feeling of militaries as guardian of the nation, not merely as a government soldier still intact in most of the officer’s mind. The National Reform in 1998 with the Suharto’s resign, clearly affected the whole system of the nation, including the role of the military in democratic society. The military political influence to the nation also decline sharply. The politicians used this situation to assert their control to the military to pursue their own policy. Will the new democratic era solve the long strife in the civil-military relationship in Indonesia?

This essay will try to elaborate the on issues impacting the future of the military profession and discuss potential strategies for resolving civil-military relationship issues in the post Suharto era based on the constitution and current political configurations. The first period covers the time from the fall of Suharto in May 1998 to the fall of Abdurrahman Wahid in 2001; the second period covers the fall of Abdurrahman Wahid to the implementation of the UU TNI (Undang-Undang Tentara Nasional Indonesia-Law of the Indonesia National Armed Forces), and third covers the implementation of UU TNI 2004 to present.



Period 1998 – 2001



In the first period, 1998-2001, the military suffered under the continuous pressure from the euphoric domestic society and international world which forced the military to abandon its political role. According to Bilveer Singh[1], the Indonesian military responded with four policies. First, Military consolidated its unity and enhanced its hierarchical discipline and loyalty. Second, Military agreed to the reduction of its seat in the parliament from 75 to 38.

Third, Military agreed to disengage itself from Golkar, the ruling party and implemented neutral policy. Fourth, military did not use the right given to Commander of Defense Forces (CDF) to legally assume special executive and martial law powers as was provided for under Decree Number 5 of the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat—MPR) which is the highest authority of the state. It was exactly what Finer [2] mentioned in Chapter Five of His Famous Book, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics, that for intervention, there must be disposition and motives. General Wiranto as CDF did not have motive to intervene even though he had opportunity.

From that view, it is clearly that the officers’ departure from the political scene was not like defeated troops in a war. They consciously adjusted their political role based on the challenges they were facing, so they departed orderly and gradually. While maintaining its self-perception as a guardian and glue of the nation, the military offered Four New Paradigms: first, military should not be always in front; second from occupying into influencing; third, from direct to indirect influence; fourth, role sharing with other component of the nation.[3] But because the political developments did not allow it, the military consciously abandoned the political role.

It is a paradoxical thought, in one hand to try and abolish its traditional political role, but in another hand still maintaining no faith in the civilian politics.

During this difficult period, young officers of the 1973 Class of the Military Academy published in 1999 the compilation book, Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI; Pemikiran Masa Depan (The New Indonesia and the Challenges of the TNI).[4] The authors of this book recognized that they are the members of a generation which received inheritance, but they accused the givers of their inheritance of failing to set a good example for successors. The main issues discussed were Pancasila as the base of the state, the position of the Chief of the Armed Forces, TNI’s membership in the legislative body, and the military.

Many of the author’s ideas met resistance from the army, who said that the ideas were not realistic. The strangest thing about the book is the most prominent member of the class, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, did not contribute to the book. Instead he published in January 2000, his own writing in a book titled Mengatasi Krisis, Menyelamatkan Reformasi[5] (Overcoming Crisis, Saving the Reformation).

Yudhoyono discussed the need for TNI to adjust itself to national life, the future of military’s political involvement and to carefully observe the course of debates about whether the military should discard the political role quickly or gradually. Consecutively, TNI’s Commander in Chief stated on April 2000 that the main task of TNI is to act as the major component in the defense of the state, to foil any aggression and to guarantee the national interest[6].

The civil-military problem that emerged in the new democratic country is not something unusual. As Samuel Huntington stated in his book, that the problems in civil-military relations in new democracies are likely to come not from the military but from the civilian side of equation due to their failures to promote economic development , maintain the law and order, weak political institutions and ambitious political leaders who may enlist the military as their accomplices[7].

This was clearly showed in the controversy surrounding the decision of the People’s Consultative Assembly, MPR No VII/2000. The decision of the Assembly for the month of August 2000 stated that the TNI’s membership in the People’s Consultative Assembly would last at least through the year 2009. For some political observers, the decision to prolong the political role of the military even after the military itself discarded that role only showed how the civilian politicians had an inferiority complex when dealing with the military.

In another incident, President Abdurrahman Wahid interceded in the replacement of the TNI’s CinC and appointment of Agus Wirahadikusuma to lead the army. This was perceived as an intrusion of civilian authority which went against the norm and regulations of the organization. The rejection by the Army caused Agus Wirahadikusuma to lose his position, and President Abdurrahman Wahid ultimately lost his support base from the military which brought him down from his presidency.

Period 2001 – 2004



In the second period, 2001-2004, Vice President Megawati who succeeded Wahid, tried to understand the military better by drawing from lessons and avoided carelessly approaching the military. She dealt so carefully with the military issues, even she almost forgot the rotation of the military leadership. The lesson she learned was the military continues to be an indirect political force and must be taken into account. Her stances clearly are proof of her consciousness and sensitivities toward TNI political power, which consequenly influenced the composition of her cabinet.

The tragedy September 11, 2001 probably became the turning point for the American attitude towards the political role of the military in third world countries. In response to that disaster, President Bush declared Global War on Terror. A new tendency rose in the US government attitude towards military regime, as we saw the U.S. policy towards Pakistan . If US government wanted to accelerate the fight towards Islamic Terrorists in Indonesia, than it was possible that the US would choose the military as a partner. The military’s political involvement would also bloc the Islamic hardliner party from spreading their ideology further. But Indonesia ’s president, worked closely with the U.S. government chose to have close cooperation with the Indonesian Police.

The continuing economic problems, violence associated with separatists and political corruption all eroded confidence in Sukarnoputri’s government. In July 2004 she survived the initial round of voting in the country’s first-ever direct presidential election but in the second round, she was easily defeated by her opponent, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.



Period 2004 - present



In the 2004, during the third period, there was a general election. This general election gave a good opportunity for the political parties to show their skill and knowledge. Again, the political parties competed for alliances with the former military officers. There was almost no party that did not put the former military officers at the top of the legislative candidates list. Even in the presidential election, most of the candidates attempted to have former military as their partners. With bad news from the Parliament building spreading, such as money politics, the independent and newspaper polls showed that the popularity of politicians had declined and the military rose.

The result of the presidential election clearly showed that Yudhoyono, the former military officer, as the most popular candidate and he became president to replace Megawati. Considering the condition of the politicians and political parties and the long history of military domination in Indonesia , it is certainly not easy to put aside the military from the national life.

The problems are not only the politicians, but also the fundamental problems in the civil-military relations. Some examples of the problems in Indonesia are the fragmented society, limited financial resources for the military, and the lack of civilians who have sufficient skill and knowledge to cope with the security and defense issues. At this point, U.S. government supported the democratic administration under Yudhoyono, who also one of the prominent figures in the TNI reformation, to continue its internal reforms.

Even though the military remains a fulcrum in the political point of view, the military avoids the day to day politics. TNI’s CDF clearly stated that the active military duty, not only forbids the military from being involved in politics, but he also warned politicians not to drag the military into politics any longer as had happened in the past[8].

The lack of civilians who have sufficient skill and knowledge to cope with the security and defense issues clearly stated in the UU TNI which was implemented in December 2004. It stated that the process of integrating a military headquarter into the Department of Defense would have to wait until a suitable time in the future[9].

The other reason is the need for the required politician maturity to avoid the possibility of the military being used for the political purpose of the Minister of Defense. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono continues to gradually maintain the TNI’s Reformation and at the same time tries to foster the democratic institution without creating turmoil in the military side.



The future of the professional military

To review TNI’s internal reform up to this point, it seems that most of the TNI’s reformation agenda today are heading in the right direction. Some of the deficiencies TNI is facing now must be considered as a necessary part of the process. Apart from that, there are some considerations to look at closely in order to reach the goals, avoiding the military’s political involvement and becoming a fully professional military.

TNI has long been involved in non military issues, such as political and economical life. It will not be an easy task and not as simple as what was imagined for the military to become professional soldiers. On one hand, it is apparent that Indonesia will have a professional military, mainly because TNI itself shows a strong tendency toward professionalism, especially after the implementation of UU TNI.

On the other hand, it is clear there are some obstacles and challenges which could become a barrier for the creation of the profesional military if these obstacles and challenges are not properly addressed. In other words, Indonesia and specifically TNI, need to fulfill some basic requirements in an effort to develop a professional military. These requirements become sine qua non , externally or internally , in the macro and micro level, even in the longterm and shortterm solutions. These basic requirements become driving forces and key factors which support a wheel of change towards professional military.

These main basic requirements are economical, social, political, technological, and curricula military education. These requirements are not only non-dichotomic to one another but also not meant to be a requirement that one is more important than the other. All requirements are considered to have the same degree of influence in supporting the creation of TNI’s professionalism in the future. Legally, the TNI’s reformation to become professional has been completed, but in reality still need lots of works to be done.

It is the Indonesian military culture which always perceives that their competence or expertise in the security issues is superior compare to the civilian authorities. It is exactly what Ulrich mentioned in her article Infusing Normatif Civil-Military Relations Principles in the Officer Corps[10]. It will require time for TNI to adjust to the latest development in the spirit of military reform.

Beyond the military jurisdiction, there are three main points to remember which could hinder the creation of profesional military. First, the politicization of the military by the elite politicians; second, the absence of wishes by political decision makers to truly understand the various law that regulate the problem of national defence; and third, the decline of the political stance of the public regarding the political role of military as a result of the public frustration at civilian politicians[11].

These three main points have significant influence for the TNI. These civil–military relationship problems are different compared to what happens in the US. In Indonesia, the politicians continously try to get military support for the benefit of their party, while according to Nielsen, in the US the politicians and civilians worry about military involvement in the decision making process[12]. She states, there are two ways in which military participation in use-of-force decision making could affect the future of the military profession. First, military participation could adversely impact future interaction between political leaders and military officers and second, more speculatively, it could bring into question the military’s jurisdiction by shaping the scope of what is thought to be legitimate professional work.

For the Indonesian people outside the military, it’s time to understand the mind behind TNI’s dynamic thought to abandon its traditional political role and move towards a professional military. The notion that the military is suppose to be the most powerful political force comes from Suharto using the military to prolong his power. In light of this, the military no longer dominates politics, but only supports the government. But if the politicians cannot reach better compromise among themselves, then it will be very difficult to expect a stable government. History tells us, from 1945-1998, Indonesia only had two presidents, but from 1998-2004, Indonesia had four presidents. History also shows, when the existence of a nation is at stake, the military will prop up the government as the savior of the nation.



Conclusion



The feeling of Indonesian military as a guardian for the nation still intact today based on the history of its establishment and created a strife in the civil-military relationship in Indonesia . The fall of Suharto in 1998 and the implementation of the UU TNI in 2004 forced a military departure from political stage. The future of military professionalism will depend on the fulfillment of the basic requirement in the economical, social, politics, technology, and curricula military education. The maturity of the politicians will decide whether the military will be involved in politics or maintain their profession.



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[1] Bilveer Singh, “Civil-Military Relations in Democratizing Indonesia : Change amidst Continuity,” in Armed Forces & Society Journal,Vol 26, Nr.4 Summer 2000, 620.
[2] Samuel E.Finer,” Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics,”(Pall Mall Press, 1962), 63.
[3] Markas Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, ABRI Abad XXI, (Mabes ABRI, Jakarta,1999)11-13. Transl.: Military in 21st Centuries, published by Indonesian Armed Forces HQ.
[4] Agus Wirahadikusuma, MPA., et al.,Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI:Pemikiran Masa Depan.(Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta, 1999). Title Transl.:The New Indonesia and the Challenges of the TNI
[5] Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, Mengatasi Krisis Menyelamatkan Reformasi (Puskap, Jakarta , 2000) 40. Title Transl.: Overcoming the Crisis and Saving the Reformation.
[6] The Press Release of the TNI’s CinC after the TNI Commander’s Call, Jakarta , April 20, 2000.
[7] Samuel P. Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” in Larry Diamond and Marc F. Platner (eds), Civil Military Relation and Democracy, (John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996) 14.
[8] Prajurit TNI Harus Netral pada Pilkada dan Pemilu (Soldier Must Be Neutral in Regional and General Election), available from http://www.suarakarya-online.com/news.html?id=197009: accessed 8 May 2008.
[9] UU TNI No.34/2004 Penjelasan Pasal 3 Ayat 2 (TNI Bill Nr.34/2004, the Explaination of Chapter 3, Section2).
[10] Marybeth P. Ulrich, “Infusing Normatif Civil-Military Relations Principles in the Officer Corps,” in Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (eds), The Future of the Army Profession, (McGraw Hill Custom Publishing, Boston ,2005) 659.
[11] Ikrar Nusa Bhakti,”Reformasi TNI dan Sejumlah Kendala” (Koran Tempo, Jakarta , Oct 6, 2003)Title Transl.:(Military Reforms and Some Obstacles)
[12] Suzanne C. Nielsen, “Rules of the Game? The Weinberg Doctrine and the American Use of Force,” in Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews (eds), The Future of the Army Profession, (McGraw Hill Custom Publishing, Boston ,2005) 646.